ENSURING ORGANIZATIONAL AND ECONOMIC MECHANISMS FOR HOUSING STOCK MANAGEMENT
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20449070Keywords:
housing stock management; organizational and economic mechanism; tariff regulation; performance indicators; capital repair reserve; digital governance; transaction costs.Abstract
This paper investigates how organizational and economic mechanisms in housing stock management can
be upgraded to improve efficiency, transparency, and financial resilience amid asset deterioration and fragmented
stakeholder accountability. The objective is to design an integrated mechanism that aligns incentives among homeowners,
management companies, service contractors, and local authorities. The study combines institutional analysis, process
modeling of the management cycle, and a comparative assessment of tariff and contract designs using a synthesized
dataset representing typical multi-apartment building portfolios. The scientific novelty of the study is reflected in a structured
framework that connects governance forms, cost allocation rules, performance indicators, and digital control tools into
a single coordination model. The results specify measurable target parameters for preventive maintenance planning,
reserve fund formation, and service quality monitoring. The practical value of the study is expressed through proposals
for standardized contracts, KPI-based oversight, and a phased digitalization roadmap aimed at lowering transaction costs
and strengthening accountability.
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